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populist discourses in the Czech Republic
Seongcheol Kim
Research Unit “Democracy and Democratization”, WZB Berlin Social Science Centre, Berlin, Germany
ABSTRACT
This paper draws on Laclau’s theory of discourse, hegemony, and
populism to analyse competing forms of populism in the Czech
Republic within the discursive context of ‘post-November
transformation’ as well as in relation to hegemonic struggles over
the construction of social order. It is argued that the discourses of
Public Aﬀairs (VV), ANO, Dawn of Direct Democracy, and Freedom
and Direct Democracy (SPD) all feature a populist opposition
between the ‘people’ or ‘citizens’ on the one hand and ‘political
dinosaurs’, (‘traditional’) ‘parties’, or ‘godfather party maﬁas’ of
both ‘left’ and ‘right’ on the other, while also radicalizing in
diﬀerent ways the exclusionary constructions of ‘work’ in the
established discourses of the Civic Democrats (ODS) and Social
Democrats (ČSSD). While ANO constructs ‘hard work’ in a populist
manner against the (‘traditional’) ‘parties’, VV and Dawn/SPD
articulate an exclusion of non-working ‘unadaptables’ that points







Following weeks of post-election uncertainty, the successful formation of a minority
coalition government of Andrej Babiš’s ANO and the Social Democrats (ČSSD) with exter-
nal support from the Communist Party (KSČM) in 2018 marked the culmination of at least
three notable developments in Czech party politics: 1) the rise of ANO to the status of main
governing party within seven years of its founding; 2) the conﬁrmed unwillingness of ANO
to govern with its far-right populist competitor, Tomio Okamura’s Freedom and Direct
Democracy (SPD), in a ‘populist coalition’; and 3) the inclusion of the Communists in a gov-
erning arrangement for the ﬁrst time since 1990, suggesting a dislocation in the rules of
the game that had long deﬁned party politics in the ‘post-November’ period. This paper
proposes to unpack the diﬀerent aspects of this present conjuncture with a discursive
approach that not only parses Babiš’s distinctive brand of populism, which has been
referred to as ‘managerial’ (Císař & Štětka, 2017) or ‘technocratic populism’ (Buštíková &
Guasti, 2019) with both an ‘illiberal’ (Hanley & Vachudova, 2018; Havlík, 2019) and an
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apparently neo-liberal thrust (as seen in the promise to ‘run the state like a ﬁrm’), but also
situates it both within its discursive context of emergence and in relation to competing
forms of populism. To this end, this paper draws on the discourse-theoretical perspective
of the so-called Essex School (1996/2007, 2005; Laclau & Mouﬀe, 1985/2001; Laclau, 1990),
which has found increasingly widespread application in the study of populism. This discur-
sive approach, broadly in line with the wider genre of ‘ideational’ theories of populism,1
conceptualizes populism in terms of an antagonistic divide between a popular subject
and a power bloc, which can in turn take on a wide variety of constructions (e.g.
Mudde, 2004; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013; Stanley, 2008). This relatively formal
understanding of populism not only allows for analytical distinctions between populism
and the likes of nationalism or nativism in terms of how ‘the people’ is constructed (De
Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017; Stavrakakis, Katsambekis, Nikisianis, Kioupkiolis, & Siomos,
2017a; see also Mudde, 2007; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013), but can also draw on
the ‘methodological holism’ (Marttila, 2015) of a theory of discourse, hegemony, and
populism that provides the conceptual tools for situating discourses in relation to hege-
monic practices and struggles over the constitution of social order (Palonen, 2009; De
Cleen, Glynos, & Mondon, 2018; Nonhoﬀ, 2019).
What follows here is an overview of this theoretical perspective and then a discourse-
analytic account of competing populisms in the Czech Republic both diachronically in
terms of their emergence from established discursive structurations of post-1989 party
politics and synchronically in terms of their competing hegemonic claims over ‘the
people’ and the various contents attached to them. As will be seen, the Czech case is
notable not least for the early salience of a strongly neo-liberal transformation project
that then-PM Václav Klaus famously summarized as ‘market economy without adjectives’
as well as a largely diﬀerential and non-antagonistic context of left/right competition, as
exempliﬁed in the 1990s Opposition Agreements. It is in the context of dislocations in
this hegemonic stability that populist challenges subsequently emerge in the form of
Public Aﬀairs (VV), ANO, and Dawn of Direct Democracy as well as its oﬀshoot Freedom
and Direct Democracy (SPD), all of which interpellate the ‘people’ or ‘citizens’ against a
power bloc of established forces of both ‘left’ and ‘right’. Yet these populist discourses
are also notable for the selective reproduction and indeed radicalization of hegemonic
eﬀects from the established discursive context, most notably the exclusionary construc-
tions of ‘work’ that pervade the discourses of both the Civic Democrats (ODS) and
Social Democrats (ČSSD) throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. While ANO articulates
notions of entrepreneurship and ‘hard work’ in the populist terms of ‘people’ against
the ‘politicians’, the discourses of VV and Dawn/SPD radicalize the exclusionary construc-
tion of ‘work’ in opposition to ‘unadaptables’ and ‘scroungers’ who supposedly live oﬀ the
work of others, thus combining a populism directed against established forces with a
hyper-neoliberal welfare chauvinism that associates the category of ‘unadaptables’ with
entire minorities such as the Roma and ‘immigrants’ and thus also dovetails with an
anti-minorities illiberalism, all the way up to SPD’s demand for a ban on Islam in the
Czech Republic in the name of ‘freedom’ – closely resembling what has been described
as a ‘neoconservative’ position (Vossen, 2011) in the case of the Dutch Party for
Freedom (PVV). The radicalizing dynamic in SPD’s discourse can thus be seen not only
vis-à-vis earlier neo-liberal discourses, but also in relation to the populist constructions
in the competing discourse of ANO.
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Discourse, hegemony, populism: an overview
Laclau’s (2005) theory of populism is grounded in a theory of discourse and hegemony
(Laclau, 1990; Laclau & Mouﬀe, 1985/2001, 1996/2007) that posits the discursively consti-
tuted nature of social reality through logics of diﬀerence and equivalence as well as the
primacy of the political qua antagonism as the instituting moment of this reality (Marchart,
2007, 2018). To take a schematic example: the identities of discursive elements such as
‘freedom’ and ‘equality’ are diﬀerential in relation to each other, but can also be articulated
equivalentially in common antagonistic demarcation from a constitutive outside (e.g. ‘dic-
tatorship’ or indeed ‘communism’); this chain of equivalences can be extended further
(‘freedom’, ‘equality’, ‘higher wages’,…) to generate an antagonistic frontier against the
common outside and deﬁne the social space in terms of this division. Hegemony, then,
is this operation of organizing and reproducing a set of meanings into a system of diﬀer-
ences – in other words, constructing a certain version of ‘society’ – around nodal points
that equivalentially link diﬀerential elements (e.g. ‘democracy’ linking ‘freedom’, ‘equality’,
etc. against ‘dictatorship’).2 Yet the contingent nature of social identities means that other
nodal points could likewise perform this function of partial ﬁxation around new opposi-
tions (e.g. ‘the nation’ linking ‘freedom’, ‘equality’, etc. against a ‘dictatorship’ deemed
to be ‘foreign’); the hegemony of a particular discursive construction is thus always the
contingent result of a political contestation and constantly subject to dislocations, or inter-
ruptions in the structured production of meaning (e.g. the claim that actually existing
‘democracy’ has not fulﬁlled the promise of ‘freedom’ and/or ‘equality’).
Laclau (2005) suggests that if the basic unit of discourse is conceptualized as a demand
(‘freedom’, ‘equality’, ‘higher wages’,…) that calls upon some locus of power for its fulﬁl-
ment, it becomes possible to identify two basic modes in which politics as a struggle for
hegemony takes place: a primarily diﬀerential, or institutionalist, articulation of demands
treats each demand in its particularity – with the result that politics is understood as a
ﬁeld of diﬀerences without an antagonistic frontier dividing it – whereas a primarily equiv-
alential, or populist, articulation constructs a chain of equivalences of unfulﬁlled (or dislo-
cated) demands generating an antagonistic frontier between a ‘people’ as the collective
subject of demands and a power bloc supposedly blocking their realization. Seen this
way, populism becomes another name for the political – leading to Laclau’s (2005,
p. 154) controversial claim to this eﬀect – insofar as any construction of a collective
subject through a logic of equivalence would be populist to some extent; yet it is also
clear that not every equivalential articulation of demands takes onto itself the name of
a ‘people’ or is addressed to ‘power’ (Stavrakakis, 2004). Subsequent work drawing on
Laclau’s theory emphasizes – in a similar vein to the likes of Mudde (2007, pp. 15–26) –
that populism is distinguishable from the likes of nationalism or nativism depending on
the ‘discursive architectonics’ of how ‘the people’ and its outside are constructed (De
Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017; Stavrakakis et al., 2017a; Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014).
Populism thus becomes conceptually distinguishable from institutionalism on the one
hand and the likes of nationalism or nativism on the other in terms of the degree and
type of antagonistic division, respectively: institutionalism entails a non-antagonistic con-
struction of the relationship between the addressers and addressees of demands, whereas
populism constructs a popular underdog subject against a power bloc (e.g. ‘elite’, ‘oligar-
chy’) – as opposed to a national subject against a national Other (nationalism) or external
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immigrants (nativism). These logics are, of course, combinable but conceptually distinct
(e.g. ‘the people’ against foreign powers pointing to a joint articulation of nationalism
and populism), making it possible to identify what Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2013)
refer to as ‘exclusionary populism’, which excludes ethnic, religious, or sexual minorities
in addition to ‘the elite’. In identifying a particular discourse as primarily populist and/or
nationalist, the key question is what nodal point(s) takes on the recurrent structuring func-
tion of equivalentially linking the diﬀerent elements and thus holding together an ensem-
ble of signifying practices.
The ‘methodological holism’ (Marttila, 2015) of Essex School or post-foundational dis-
course analysis (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000; Marttila, 2015; Nonhoﬀ, 2019) consists in
drawing on the aforementioned discourse-theoretical categories as analytical concepts
for the study of discourses in terms of the formation and displacements of antagonistic
frontiers, the diﬀerential or equivalential articulation of demands, and their structuration
around nodal points against constitutive outsides. Insofar as the overarching framework
is one of discourse and hegemony theory, the discourse analysis is also a form of hege-
mony analysis (Nonhoﬀ, 2019) that examines discursive practices both diachronically in
their hegemonically structured contexts of emergence and synchronically in terms of com-
peting hegemonic claims. Following this line of inquiry, the following analysis begins with
the established discursive context of ‘post-November transformation’ in the Czech Repub-
lic and identiﬁes signiﬁers that cross-cut competing party discourses synchronously and/or
over time, suggesting hegemonic eﬀects that are reproduced across the discursive space
of party competition. The analysis then works its way through the diﬀerent populist dis-
courses with a particular focus on their constructions of the people/power frontier as
well as hegemonic eﬀects traceable back to the established discursive context. In line
with an expansive theoretical understanding of discursivity as encompassing all signifying
practices, the analysis seeks to triangulate between numerous forms of source material
ranging from party programmes, leaders’ speeches, and published interviews to electoral
campaign slogans and billboards.
Populism in the Czech Republic: a discourse and hegemony analysis
‘Post-november transformation’ as hegemonic formation
In a 1995 speech at the Brno University of Technology, then-Prime Minister Václav Klaus
(1995) proposed that
the post-November transformation of our country, which is still in progress, is a transformation
of the system and by no means of people. […] If we want to alter the limitations on human life
and human freedom, and this was precisely the goal of our transformation process, then it is
clear that our goal had to be the creation of new conditions for our lives and our mutual
societal interactions […].
Perhaps no syntagma better captures the condensation of an entire imaginary of tran-
sition in the discursive space than the notion of ‘post-November transformation’: ‘post-
November’ referring to the imagined break of November 1989 that inaugurates the trans-
formation of an entire system of social relations, whereby basic categories such as ‘state’,
‘citizen’, ‘economy’, and ‘society’ are re-signiﬁed as nodal points instituting a new ‘post-
November’ reality. ‘Post-November transformation’ can be understood, in a wider sense,
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to designate a hegemonic formation within which competing party discourses, such as
those of the Civic Democrats (ODS) and the Social Democrats (ČSSD), presented diﬀeren-
tial constructions of these signiﬁers while situating themselves within a common horizon
of transition (e.g. shared commitment to ‘market economy’ or ‘Europe’, but with variations
on the meaning) – from Klaus’ ‘market economy without adjectives’ to the ČSSD’s ‘socially
and ecologically oriented market economy’. If Václav Havel’s Civic Forum (OF) had insti-
tuted ‘Europe’ as one of the nodal points of transition with its 1990 election campaign cen-
tered on the slogan ‘Back to Europe’, the ODS (1992, p. 1), positioning itself as the ‘main
heir’ (Pšeja, 2005) to the OF, took this up with the claim that ‘the path to Europe is a
path to home’ and the conservative articulation of a return to the ‘basic values of European
Christian civilization’ – whereas the ČSSD (1996, p. 2) appealed to ‘the European social
model’ and advocated in social-democratic terms ‘the entry to European institutions
with their social, ecological, economic, and moral standards’ as a process of ‘the Czech
Republic join[ing] the main current of European thought’.
A key feature of this hegemonic formation, then, was that such competing construc-
tions could be articulated in largely diﬀerential and non-antagonistic terms: while the
ODS and the ČSSD, as the two dominant parties emerging from parliamentary elections
between 1996 and 2010, articulated moments of antagonistic division in the context of
electoral competition – such as Klaus’ recurring defence of ‘freedom’ against ‘socialism’
and the ČSSD’s 1996 and 1998 election slogan ‘Humanity against selﬁshness’ – these
antagonisms could be defused into diﬀerences whenever the stability of the ‘post-Novem-
ber’ order as a whole was at stake. This was illustrated in exemplary fashion by the so-
called Opposition Agreements of 1996 and 1998, whereby the ČSSD agreed to tolerate
Klaus’ ODS-led minority government following the 1996 elections (in exchange for ČSSD
chairman Miloš Zeman’s election as president of the lower chamber) and the ODS
returned the favour following the snap 1998 elections (this time in exchange for Klaus’
election as president of the lower chamber). In the latter instance, the two parties con-
cluded a written agreement justifying the compromise in the following terms:
The above named parties, in awareness of the threat of political instability and in the interest
of the preservation of basic democratic principles, aware of the responsibility given to them by
the voters, aware of the responsibility for the securing of long-term political stability in the
Czech Republic and for the continuation of the economic and societal transformation initiated
in November 1989, and aware of the further responsibility for the standing of the Czech
Republic in the world, conclude between themselves this agreement on the creation of a
stable political environment in the Czech Republic (ČSSD & ODS, 1998).
It becomes possible to speak of a hegemonic formation precisely in this sense of an
ensemble of institutionalized practices (such as the formalized toleration of minority gov-
ernments) capable of reproducing itself across a certain timeframe by stabilizing antagon-
isms into diﬀerences – the ODS and ČSSD as representing simply diﬀerential, rather than
mutually exclusive, paths ‘to Europe’ and a ‘market economy’ within a common post-1989
horizon – and thus overriding left/right divisions in deﬁning the twomain parties’ position-
ings at key post-electoral junctures in the 1990s. This system of diﬀerences, in turn, was
constituted by a founding exclusion in the form of the cordon sanitaire placed on the Com-
munist Party (KSČM) and the far-right Republicans (SPR-RSČ) by all other parliamentary
parties.3 This was exempliﬁed by the ČSSD’s Bohumín congress resolution of 1995,
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which aﬃrmed ‘the impermissibility of cooperation by social democracy with extremist
political parties’ and ‘rule[d] out political cooperation’ with a list of parties including the
SPR-RSČ and KSČM. The ČSSD thus circumscribed the extent to which it could enact a
left/right divide on the level of government formation and, in eﬀect, left itself no other
option than a deal with the ODS (which it made in 1998) or a coalition with smaller
centre-right parties such as the Christian Democrats (which it formed in 2002) in the
absence of an outright majority.
A key line of diﬀerentiation within this hegemonic formation from the early 1990s
onwards consisted in competing constructions of the state and its relation to the
citizen. Here, the ODS’s discourse was centered on an opposition between the ‘individual’
and his/her activity in the ‘free market’ on the one hand and the ‘state’ whose function
must be conﬁned to ‘the protection of private property and of freely concluded contracts’
on the other (ODS, 1992, p. 13):
Right now the decision is between a prosperous market economy built on the initiative of the
individual or the hopeless ineﬃciency of a state-controlled economy (ODS, 1992, p. 1)
The basis of economic prosperity is not the state, but the individual as the carrier of economic
activity and initiative (ODS, 1992, p. 13).
The ODS is convinced that the basis of the prosperity of society is the free decision and activity
of the individual and the basis of economic policy is the free market (ODS, 1996, p. 24).
In this neo-liberal discourse, the ‘individual’ as the building block of economy and society
was linked to a set of speciﬁc characteristics: in its self-deﬁnition as a ‘civic’ party, the ODS
(1998, p. 1) aﬃrmed that it ‘is oriented toward hard-working, enterprising, and responsible
people’. The category of the ‘individual’, then, was instituted in the ODS discourse through
an exclusion: only the ‘hard-working, enterprising, and responsible’ could live up to the
function of ‘the individual’ as ‘the basis of economic prosperity’. Indeed, in response to
the electoral rise of the ČSSD and the latter’s call for a ‘society of solidarity’, the ODS
sought to re-articulate the signiﬁer ‘solidarity’ in an explicitly delimited sense, in line
with its exclusion of the non-‘enterprising’ and non-‘responsible’:
The ODS is also the party of solidarity between people. It starts from the premise that a respon-
sible person, whether of old age, weak, or disabled, has an unquestionable claim to the soli-
darity of others, while the lazy and dishonest can have no such high claim (ODS, 1998, p. 1;
emphasis added).
In the ODS discourse, therefore, ‘work’ took on the function of an exclusionary criterion
that set apart those actually interpellated by the nodal point ‘the individual’ from those
who were not. In the ČSSD discourse, too, however, the nodal point ‘work’ – which, as a
counterpart to the ODS signiﬁer ‘the individual’, took on the privileged function of desig-
nating the basic driver of economy and society – was equivalentially constituted in terms
of an exclusion, with the qualiﬁer ‘honest’ work serving to exclude those with ill-gotten
gains:
In its electoral program, Czech social democracy upholds the values of honest work, which is
the sole source of the actual wealth of society. We therefore want to address labourers, tech-
nicians, agricultural workers, service workers, doctors, teachers, artists, academics, and entre-
preneurs. We do not address fraudsters or those who became wealthy through abuse of their
functions (ČSSD, 1996, p. 24).
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We want to live in a society in which it is possible to become wealthy only through honest
work and where each member can develop under digniﬁed living conditions (ČSSD, 1998,
p. 4).
Our goal is a modern solidaristic society and prosperity for all honest people (ČSSD, 2002, p. 2).
Already in the 1990s and early 2000s, the predominantly institutionalist discourses of the
two main parties were constituted by exclusions – ‘honest work’ and ‘hard-working, enter-
prising, and responsible individuals’ – that would later prove to be fertile ground for chal-
lenger discourses that would radicalize these nodal points in diﬀerent ways by extending
the exclusionary scope. In the case of the ODS, there was a clear tension between the neo-
liberal exclusion of non-‘enterprising’, non-‘responsible’ individuals on the one hand and a
political liberalism that recognized the inalienable rights of all individuals and even the
collective rights of ‘disadvantaged groups’ on the other:
Liberalism means the recognition of the sovereignty of the individual, the securing of his
rights and freedoms, and also the rights of disadvantaged groups – social, religious, national,
and political (ODS, 1992, p. 5).
[The ODS] is a liberal party because it honours the individual as the main carrier of basic rights
and freedoms (ODS, 1998, p. 1).
This equivalential link between economic and political liberalism would subsequently
be decoupled with a vengeance in far-right discourses that deny the rights of ‘unadapta-
ble minorities’ such as the Roma who supposedly live on welfare beneﬁts without working.
In this context, the ODS (1998, pp. 9–10) also presented a vision of a ‘cheap state’with the
citizen as its ‘customer’ in opposition to the ‘populist’welfare promises of ‘left-wing parties’ –
a continuation of an anti-populist strategy (seen in previous ODS election campaigns) of
associating ‘populism’ with ‘the left’ and its ‘social demagoguery’. The ODS (1998, p. 11),
in contrast, promised a low-tax state with a ﬂat income tax as well as an ‘orientation
toward the citizen as a customer’. In the 2006 campaign, ODS PM candidateMirek Topolánek
went still further, opening his preface to the party’s electoral programmewith the statement:
‘I would wish our state to be like my oﬃce: small, functional, and friendly’ (ODS, 2006, p. 3). In
the 2010 campaign, the ODS (2010, p. 4, 6) called for a ‘cheap and safe state’ and, in an
extension of its neo-liberalism, claimed that ‘the state is like a family’ that must cut its
expenses and learn to live within its means in order to avoid a sovereign debt crisis: ‘The
Hungarians, the Latvians, and now the Greeks have learned for themselves. It is very irre-
sponsible to claim that this doesn’t threaten us.’ The hegemonic eﬀects of this anti-debt dis-
course could be seen in the manner in which the ČSSD (2010, p. 4, 6), in the same 2010
elections, acknowledged the priority of a ‘rational budgetary policy against indebtedness’
with the goal of reducing the deﬁcit to below three per cent of GDP by 2013, while
aﬃrming that ‘[t]he citizen is a customer of the state’ insofar as the state’s role is to
‘ensure the citizen’s equal access to quality services’.
In the meantime, however, the ‘post-November’ hegemonic formation had begun to
unravel in the context of the 2006 elections and their aftermath. One aspect of this was
that the ODS, in 2006 (after eight years in opposition), 2010, and 2013, repeatedly ran
anti-communist electoral campaigns accusing the ČSSD of secretly planning a coalition
with the KSČM, thereby also positioning itself as the sole guardian of the post-1989
order and suspending the common horizon of ‘post-November’ transformation as one
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existing above and beyond – indeed, capable of incorporating – left/right diﬀerences. This
anti-communist discourse notably emphasized the newness of the alleged threat coming
jointly from the ČSSD and KSČM; Topolánek wrote in his preface to the ODS’s 2006 election
programme: ‘For the ﬁrst time since November 1989 there is the real possibility of a
breakup of the democratic consensus and the return of the communists to running
state aﬀairs’ (ODS, 2006). Following the 2006 elections, the failure of talks between the
ODS and ČSSD on an Opposition Agreement-like arrangement and the Topolánek minority
government’s subsequent defeat in a conﬁdence vote – the ﬁrst such instance after 1989 –
constituted a major dislocation in the ‘post-November’ hegemonic formation and its
capacity to defuse left/right divisions in reproducing the conditions of ‘political stability’
that the 1998 Opposition Agreement had referred to. The ODS-led coalition government
that did win a conﬁdence vote seven months after the elections (thanks to two ČSSD
rebels) fell just two years later when the ČSSD-KSČM opposition succeeded in its ﬁfth
attempt at a motion of no conﬁdence; early elections were scheduled for October 2009
under a caretaker government headed by non-politician Jan Fischer, but had to be
delayed due to a last-minute Constitutional Court ruling, followed by the ČSSD’s decision
to withdraw support for early elections (after a constitutional amendment to comply with
the ruling had already been passed).
Enter populism: from Public Aﬀairs to SPD
The May 2010 elections thus took place in a context of protracted breakdowns in the hege-
monic stability that had been a recurring promise of the ‘post-November’ order. Against
this background, the Public Aﬀairs (VV) party stormed into parliament with nearly 11
per cent of the vote on the back of a strongly populist discourse pitting the ‘people’
against the ‘political dinosaurs’ of both ‘left’ and ‘right’ who had run the country since
1989. As VV chairman Radek John put it in a pre-election interview:
We are the only post-communist country that still has not replaced the political generation of
post-November politicians with the young generation. So as a general deﬁnition, [political
dinosaurs] are people who were in all these corruption scandals involving privatization, resti-
tution, army purchases of Gripens, Pandurs, and more.
[…] [T]his is not a personal attack against dinosaurs. They carried out their work and should
step down. When they are here longer than two electoral periods, it smacks of a big risk
because a politician loses contact with the normal lives and normal problems of people
(Danda, 2010).
VV articulated this antagonistic frontier against ‘dinosaurs’ not only in terms of corrup-
tion, but also in terms of the left/right logic that this populism now sought to displace, as
VV campaign manager Vít Bárta stated in another interview:
The classic example of dinosaurs of politics is a strict right-left perception of society. This is the
view of a past political generation that is gone. This perception of the world has unleashed
dissatisfaction in our country, has ceased to work, and this is why the call for change is
being heard. There is also a centrist ideology, an ideology of correct solutions. This is what I
subscribe to (Buchert, 2010)
The VV discourse –which Havlík and Hloušek (2014) have referred to as ‘centrist populist’ –
thus dislocated the promise of established party discourses to deliver the goods of ‘post-
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November’ transition in their ‘left’ and ‘right’ variations; the counter-hegemonic move,
then, was to displace the frontier deﬁning party competition from left/right to ‘dino-
saurs’/non-‘dinosaurs’ or indeed newness/oldness (Sikk, 2012). This was also reﬂected in
the party’s coalition signalling strategy, with John denouncing individual politicians
across the party spectrum as ‘dinosaurs’ – most notably the ODS ex-PMs Mirek Topolánek
and Václav Klaus, TOP 09 co-founder Miroslav Kalousek, and especially ČSSD PM candidate
Jiří Paroubek –while explicitly accepting ODS PM candidate Petr Nečas as a non-‘dinosaur’;
following the elections, VV would join a Nečas-led coalition government with the ODS and
TOP 09.
Yet VV also took up elements of the aforementioned ODS and ČSSD discourses –
namely, the exclusionary construction of ‘responsible people’ and ‘honest work’ – and radi-
calized them by extending the exclusionary scope: those who enriched themselves by dis-
honest means now suddenly encompassed the entire ‘post-November’ political class; the
problem with the welfare system did not consist in isolated non-‘responsible’ individuals,
but in an entire class of ‘scroungers’ and ‘unadaptables’ (nepřizpůsobiví). In its election pro-
gramme, VV (2010, pp. 14–15, 26–27) headlined its social policy with the slogan ‘Social
beneﬁts: for the needy yes, for scroungers no’ and called for ‘an end to the misuse of
social beneﬁts’, pointing to security issues in ‘neighbourhoods with unadaptable citizens’
– including certain ‘unadaptable minorities’ (referring, of course, to the Roma) – and pro-
posing solutions such as ‘the uncompromising resettlement of chronic tax dodgers and
unadaptables’. Here, the neo-liberalism that the VV broadly shared with the ODS was radi-
calized into a hyper-neoliberal welfare chauvinism directed against ‘scroungers’, which in
turn (in contrast at least to the earlier ODS) linked up with an illiberalism directed against
‘minorities’ – with the signiﬁer ‘unadaptable’ serving as a nodal point equivalentially
linking both categories of undesirable citizens.
Less than a year after VV’s entry into government, however, a leaked strategy paper
from 2008 revealed Bárta’s intentions to use the party as a ‘political power base’ for his
private security ﬁrm, prompting the replacement of the VV cabinet ministers and amount-
ing to a massive dislocation of the party’s populist discourse directed against corruption
and shady business links. In 2013, the ODS-led coalition suﬀered an even bigger
scandal involving spying and abuse-of-oﬃce allegations against cabinet oﬃcials in
Nečas’ inner circle, leading to the collapse of the government and early elections (after
a caretaker government failed to win a majority). The 2013 elections thus took place in
a context in which VV had already faded into irrelevance, yet the dislocatory context of
the latter’s emergence had only become magniﬁed (partly by VV’s own doing). The
mantle of a populism directed against the class of ‘politicians’ of both left and right was
now taken up and indeed radicalized still further – albeit in diﬀerent directions – by
Andrej Babiš’s ANO and Tomio Okamura’s Dawn of Direct Democracy. ANO contested
its ﬁrst parliamentary elections in 2013 with a populist discourse that pitted the ‘people’
against the ‘politicians’ and the ‘parties’, including its famous election slogan ‘We are
not like politicians. We work hard.’ ANO’s discourse thus instituted an exclusion of the
entire class of ‘politicians’ and ‘parties’ from the established virtues of ‘hard work’ and
non-corruption, which ANO claimed to represent precisely by virtue of its identity as a
‘movement’ and not a ‘party’ as well as Babiš’s identity as a ‘businessman’ and not a ‘poli-
tician’. Asked in an interview why ANO chose to call itself a movement rather than a party,
Babiš replied:
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Because we didn’t want to be a party. All those who governed here the last 23 years are parties
and I don’t feel like a politician. I don’t want anyone to say I am a politician because I am a
businessman. And I actually see the despair here in this country under the direction of
these classical political parties, so it’s basically a declaration that we don’t belong with
them (Šváb, 2013).
At a campaign rally in Plzeň in September 2013, Babiš declared:
If anyone says the state is not a ﬁrm, then I say that it is a ﬁrm and you are shareholders of that
ﬁrm. […] This state – those commentators can say what they want – is a ﬁrm, one that is
indebted with incompetent management that steals on top. […] If you [turning to the audi-
ence] were to come to me and tell me ‘I’ll give you 100 million, but I don’t want to be listed
online,’ then I’ll say to you, ‘Dear sir, thank you, I don’t want it.’ Nobody will buy me oﬀ, I
have enough (Šváb, 2013).
In addition to the central people/politicians opposition, then, Babiš’s identity as a ‘busi-
nessman’ and not a ‘politician’ who, therefore, would not steal and would run the state
competently like a ﬁrm played a key structuring function as an additional nodal point,
making the ANO discourse a speciﬁcally entrepreneur populism. In contrast to the ODS’s
‘cheap state’, Babiš’s ‘state as a ﬁrm’ construction thus emphasized managerial compe-
tence as opposed to small size, even allowing for an active role of the state in ANO’s
policy priority of ‘giv[ing] people work’:
We are convinced that the state has to invest in times of crisis and save in times of growth. We
will revive employment with state investments in the construction of infrastructure, highways,
railways, and waterways (ANO, 2013).
Babiš, in eﬀect, took up the ODS’s emphasis on entrepreneurial initiative while displacing its
neo-liberal ideology onto a ‘managerial’ (Císař & Štětka, 2017) or even ‘technocratic’ (Buští-
ková & Guasti, 2019; Havlík, 2019) one perfectly compatible with a Keynesian counter-cyclical
ﬁscal policy – under the premise that only a ‘businessman’ possessed the requisite know-
how, immunity from corruption, and ‘hard work’ ethic for taking these necessary measures,
as opposed to the ‘politicians’ (this being the element of populism).
In the same 2013 elections, the discourse of Tomio Okamura’s far-right Dawn of Direct
Democracy was based on a strategy of radicalizing a similar opposition between the ‘citi-
zens’ and the ‘godfather party maﬁas’ onto more far-reaching demands and exclusions
(e.g. direct election of chief executives at every level of government, recall mechanisms
against oﬃceholders, harsher criminalization of corruption in order to curtail ‘the enrich-
ment of godfather party maﬁas’ in the public sector) (Úsvit přímé demokracie, 2013). The
discourse of Dawn also took up established signiﬁers such as ‘work’ and ‘honest work’ by
denouncing a ‘social system’ that supports ‘people who have no interest in working’,
calling instead for a ‘system supporting all decent people’ that ‘restores the meaning of
“fair” entrepreneurship and honest work’. Also notable was a targeted radicalization of
the key ANO demand ‘work to the people’ by articulating this demand in nativist terms
against the threat of ‘immigrants’ taking away jobs, as seen in the slogan ‘Support to
families, not to unadaptables. Work to our [people], not to immigrants’. The discourse of
Dawn thus went farther than that of VV in adding a nativist dimension to this combination
of hyper-neoliberal welfare chauvinism and anti-minorities illiberalism, equivalentially
extending the exclusion of ‘unadaptables’ onto the perceived threat of ‘unadaptable immi-
grants’ and ‘Islamic religious fanatics’.
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After ANO entered into a coalition government with the Social Democrats and Christian
Democrats following the 2013 elections, a key displacement occurred in its discourse:
Babiš deﬁned himself and ANO in opposition to ‘traditional politicians’ and ‘traditional
parties’ (especially the ČSSD as its larger coalition partner), respectively, as well as the
various ‘power groups’ supposedly connected to them,4 while the signiﬁer ‘hard work’
took on the structuring function of a nodal point that set Babiš and ANO apart from the
‘traditional’ politicians and parties. As Babiš wrote in the preface to ANO’s 2017 election
programme:
Our movement emerged as a protest against the corruption of traditional political parties that
played the game of left and right. […] After everything we experienced in government and
parliament, we are not so naïve anymore. We know that the government is actually not led
by the premier, but by all sorts of behind-the-scenes groups, lobbyists, and advisors. […]
But that changes nothing in our basic program, which remains the same and which is
totally foreign to traditional politicians. We won’t lie, we won’t steal, we will ﬁght against cor-
ruption and ineﬃciency and we will work for the people and our country (ANO, 2017).
ANO’s election campaign again featured dichotomous messaging that, this time, pitted
especially the ‘hard work’ that ANO stood for against the ‘babble’ of ‘the traditional
parties’, as seen on posters with slogans such as ‘Fight for the capable and hardworking.
And not babble.’ This discourse thus de-emphasized the technocratic function of ‘the busi-
nessman’ as the solution to corruption and mismanagement, emphasizing instead the
‘hard work’ ethic common to ANO and the common people. Babiš (2017) even altered
his ‘state as a ﬁrm’ thesis to this eﬀect in his book What I Dream About When I Happen
to Sleep (which was published and distributed by ANO as electoral campaign material):
They often criticize me for saying that the state should be run like a ﬁrm. Well, maybe I should
say it’s better to run the state like a family ﬁrm, or even better, that the state should function to
some extent like a family. The greatest wealth, whether of a family, of a ﬁrm, or of a state, is
people, though it’s often forgotten. […] People should go into politics who have proven some-
thing in their lives, people who understand politics as a service and a calling, people who have
some kind of vision.
In contrast to the ODS’s earlier construction of the state as a family to justify an anti-debt
and austerity agenda, Babiš (2017) articulated the equivalential link between ‘state’ and
‘family’ in terms of a people-centric image of the state (against the power bloc of ‘tra-
ditional politicians’), forging a wide-ranging equivalential chain of such ‘people’ who
belong to politics more than the politicians themselves:
We have so many smart craftspeople, teachers, doctors, academics, self-employed people,
entrepreneurs, paramedics, athletes, police oﬃcers, ﬁreﬁghters, and other professions.
Maybe some of them could help society in politics as well because our country needs their
help. I cannot come to terms with the notion that decent people cannot be in politics.
If a key shift in ANO’s discourse from 2013 to 2017 was the privileging of ‘hard work’ as a
nodal point in order to set itself apart from the ‘traditional’ parties and politicians, Oka-
mura’s Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD; a spin-oﬀ of Dawn following a split) once
again played along and radicalized the signiﬁer ‘hard work’ by extending its exclusionary
scope. The party again combined a populist opposition between the ‘citizens’ and the
‘godfather party maﬁa’ with a hyper-neoliberal welfare chauvinism pitting ‘decent
people’ against ‘people who have no interest in working’ (SPD, 2017) – with Okamura
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railing against ‘unadaptables’ and ‘parasites’, deﬁned as ‘someone who is capable of work
but does not work long term’, and calling for taking away their beneﬁts in favour of ‘the
decent and the working’ (Janoušek & Janouš, 2017). This time, a new element of the party’s
discourse – organized around the nodal point ‘freedom’ –was the demand to outlaw Islam
in the Czech Republic: in a line of argument uncannily similar to that of Geert Wilders’ Party
for Freedom (PVV), Okamura argued for viewing Islam ‘not as a religion, but as an ideology’
– a ‘hateful ideology’ that ‘propagates intolerance, superiority over others’ – and for
banning it precisely in the interest of ‘freedom’ (Janoušek & Janouš, 2017). With this
pro-‘freedom’, anti-‘Islam’ position, which has been referred to as ‘neoconservative’
(Vossen, 2011, pp. 183–84) in the case of Wilders, the radicalizing dynamic in the joint
articulation of hyper-neoliberalism and illiberalism has reached the point of not only
denouncing entire minorities as ‘unadaptables’ and linking this in nativist terms to the sup-
posed threat of external migrants, but also demanding the banning of an entire religion as
a supposed threat to freedom.
It is worth noting in this context that ANO’s discursive strategy vis-à-vis SPD consisted in
formal demarcation coupled with a diﬀerential incorporation of demands: in pre-election
interviews, Babiš repeatedly ruled out a coalition with SPD and denounced the latter’s ‘absol-
utely unreal program’, while acknowledging that ‘we have the same opinion that it is necess-
ary to stop migration, on the accountability of politicians, or on direct democracy…Why
not? But that’s the only thing’ (Leinert & Srnka, 2017). Babiš thus sought to rein in the popu-
list (and partly also the nativist) dimension of SPD’s discourse as elements already rep-
resented on ANO’s agenda, while otherwise rejecting SPD as a partner and portraying it
as the radical, irresponsible foil to ANO – Okamura, after all, ‘is trying to spread fear
among people, although we do not have and will not have any migrants’ (Leinert &
Srnka, 2017). In the months of uncertainty following the elections, ANO voted together
with SPD on certain parliamentary committee posts but otherwise avoided rapprochement
on the issue of government formation, ultimately forming a coalition with the ČSSD with
conﬁdence-and-supply backing from the KSČM following a similar logic of diﬀerential incor-
poration on issues such as minimum wage rises and taxation of restituted church property.
Babiš justiﬁed the controversial move of obtaining KSČM support by articulating an equiv-
alence against the outright refusal of the ODS, in particular, to cooperate:
This situation came about only thanks to the ODS. With them we had 103 votes [out of 200 in
parliament]. […] Everyone says: the oligarch, the big businessman, and the communists. But
they behaved in a state-constructive manner and made the formation of the government
possible. Why didn’t the ODS do this? (Kolář, 2018).
Babiš thus interpellated the ODS – the party that had long positioned itself as the guardian
of the ‘post-November’ order – as responsible for the dislocation in the anti-communist
consensus that had deﬁned the rules of party competition, thus implicitly justifying this
dislocation in terms of restoring the institutional stability that had eroded since 2006.
Conclusion
A discursive approach to populism yields numerous insights into the discursive roots,
contexts of emergence, and diﬀering iterations of populism in the Czech Republic.
Party politics in the 1990s and early 2000s played out in the context of a hegemonic
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formation whereby competing discourses of ‘left’ and ‘right’ articulated diﬀerential vari-
ations on the meaning of ‘post-November transformation’. Populist challenges sub-
sequently emerge from the dislocations in this hegemonic formation and its
recurring promise of institutional stability;5 yet the ODS’s and ČSSD’s decidedly non-
populist but moralizing and exclusionary constructions of ‘hard-working, enterprising,
responsible individuals’ or ‘honest work’ – muddling the conceptual lines vis-à-vis
those ideational approaches that emphasize moralism as a deﬁning feature of popu-
lism (see also Stavrakakis & Jäger, 2018) – are also selectively taken up in later populist
discourses. The ODS’s neo-liberal discourse of entrepreneurial initiative feeds into the
entrepreneur populism of ANO, which, however, articulates the function of Babiš the
‘businessman’ in the populist terms of representing the ‘people’ against the misman-
agement of the state by ‘politicians’ and ‘parties’, while not taking up the ODS’s con-
struction of a small state tied to neo-liberal ﬁscal policies. ANO’s later populism (after
2013) becomes less technocratic and more people-centric while emphasizing ‘hard
work’ in its construction of the ‘people’, but once again in a populist manner
against the ‘traditional parties’. It is in the discourses of VV and Dawn/SPD, by contrast,
that exclusionary constructions of ‘work’ are radicalized both in hyper-neoliberal
fashion against ‘unadaptables’ in the area of social policy and as an illiberal category
encompassing ‘unadaptable minorities’, ‘unadaptable immigrants’, and eventually
‘Islam’ – a radicalizing dynamic relative to both the ODS’s prior construction of
‘work’ as an exclusionary criterion for deﬁning ‘individuals’ worthy of social support
and ANO’s increasing emphasis on ‘hard work’ to set itself apart from the ‘traditional
parties’. The hyper-neoliberalism of VV and Dawn/SPD thus links up with an illiberalism
that denies the rights of entire minority groups, all the way up to SPD’s call for
banning an entire religion in the name of ‘freedom’. In this grey area between illiber-
alism and hyper-neoliberalism, SPD’s discourse constantly follows ANO’s like a shadow,
pointing to and activating the dark potential undersides of a discourse increasingly
centered on the valorization of ‘hard work’.
Notes
1. Except, notably, on the issue of moralism as a deﬁning element of populism (see Conclusion).
2. The concept of ‘empty signiﬁer’ is omitted from the analysis here (in favor of the broader cat-
egory of ‘nodal points’) out of space and simplicity considerations.
3. The discourse of the SPR-RSČ combined elements of populism with an anti-communist nation-
alism, albeit with its populism coming to the fore in the immediate period of transition in the
early 1990s (pitting ‘ordinary people’ and the ‘will of the majority’ against a wide-ranging
power bloc of ‘communists and their cooperators’ who allegedly staged the Velvet Revolution
to stay in power; see also Hanley, 2013).
4. Consider the following claim by Babiš in a 2015 interview, which recurs in very similar form in
the 2017 election program statement: ‘Power groups have rather changed. Today, they can be
various lawyers or marketing agencies. And they still exist behind the backs of traditional pol-
itical parties. Moreover, some controversial ex-ministers still exert inﬂuence in their former
portfolios’ (Koutník, 2015).
5. Unlike Palonen’s (2009) analysis of competing populisms in Hungary, competing populisms in
the Czech Republic emerge from the breakdown of a system of ‘bipolar hegemony’ rather
than sustaining the latter.
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